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Abstract 
The prevalence of food quality standards in international trade is constantly increasing and has a growing influence on 
developing countries. A wide range of literature in development economics focused on the determinants of the standard 
adoption and on the debate of whether international standards exclude small-scale farmers from high-value food markets. 
Otherwise, when exclusion is pointed out, very little is said on how problematic such forms of exclusion are. In this paper, 
we use the Hirschman’s (1970) conceptual framework to examine which behaviors small-scale farmers adopt face to the 
incontrovertible standards, what happens to the farmers that are excluded from a specific certified market, and to what extent 
small farmers are affected to not be certified. Based on an analysis of primary data collected to examine the implication of 
GlobalGAP on the mango sector in Peru, we consider three main options for the small-scale farmers: “loyalty” 
(implementation of the  standard under specific conditions), “switch” of market segment, and “exit” from the market. The last 
option leads farmers to sell all their production to small and volatile exporters, called golondrinos (swallows). We show 
empirically that some small-scale farmers (8% of the sample) comply with GlobalGAP standard thanks to the support from 
exporters (farming contrats which include the certification cost), while others switch of market segment by complying with 
the organic certification (12,5%). Organic certification substitutes for the GlobalGAP requirement in the EU market. Finally, 
we find a significant level of exit option (24%), especially among smaller farms, less specialized, and furthest from exporter 
plants. The latter seem very affected by the changes related to the GlobalGAP standard requirements: price risk on their 
production has increased and their bargaining power and agricultural income have decreased. They are particularly 
vulnerable because their level of investment (mango trees) impedes to radically change of farm activity 
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Résumé  
L’importance grandissante des standards durables pour les produits agricoles dans le commerce international a un impact de 
plus en plus important dans les pays en développement. Dans ce papier, nous nous intéressons aux implications de la mise en 
place du standard Globalgap dans la filière mangue au Pérou pour les petits producteurs locaux. 
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1. Introduction 
The last two decades witnessed unprecedented changes in the agro-food sector through the 
proliferation of standards in international agricultural trade. After a period during which the 
states of developed countries actively implemented food safety standards (this has been 
exacerbated by a series of food scandals (Henson e Caswell, 1999)), voluntary standards 
emerging from the private sector have been developed to attend to rising consumer concerns 
regarding the conditions of production and trade of the goods they buy (Jaffee e Henson, 
2004). These voluntary standards combine a mixture of food safety, environmental, and social 
dimensions, while an inherent emphasis is being given to product traceability. Consequently, 
standards not only affect the safety of final products, but also the whole organization of the 
supply chain (Hammoudi, Hoffmann et al., 2009). For many farmers in developing countries, 
investing in agricultural niches for exportation may appear as a profitable option. However, a 
wide range of empirical literature dealing with the impact of rising international standards in 
developing countries so far has been to show that the stringent conditions tend to lead to the 
exclusion of smallholders and the inclusion of larger farmers (Key e Runsten, 1999; Dolan e 
Humphrey, 2000; Escobal, Agreda et al., 2000; Reardon, Timmer et al., 2003; Augier, 
Gasiorek et al., 2005; Vandermeer, 2006). Lack of access to human, physical, and social 
capital and the costs of certification are the most common factors explaining the non-
compliance of smallholders with standards (Busch e Bain, 2004; Vorley e Fox, 2004). On the 
contrary, some less pessimistic studies find positive effects on very small farms, which are 
included in the high-standard market through a contract-basis with the agro-exporters 
(Chemnitz, 2007a; Chemnitz, Grethe et al., 2007b; Maertens e Swinnen, 2009; Minten, 
Reardon et al., 2009; Asfaw, Mithöfer et al., 2010; Henson, Masakure et al., 2011).   
In fact, standards affect all producers differently, depending on the nature of the standard 
as well as the institutional environment of the country and the characteristics of farms 
(Chemnitz, Grethe et al., 2007b). However, very little literature examines what happens to the 
farmers that are excluded from a specific certified market and to what extent small farmers are 
affected to not be certified. Moreover, exclusion from the market requiring standards may not 
necessarily be problematic, depending on the alternative options (market, employment 
opportunities...) for farmers (Belton, Haque et al., 2011). Our paper is a contribution to the 
scarce literature analyzing the implications that international sustainability standards have on 
the behavior of (potentially) excluded farmers and their impacts in terms of marketing risks 
and income levels.  
In this paper, we focus on small-scale producers of fresh mangos in Peru. The fresh mango 
sector in Peru is an interesting case, as the private GlobalGap standard (GG) – the most 
important standard that applies to production of fresh mangos – has become quasi-mandatory 
for exportation to the European Union (EU) since 2007. Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) have 
studied the adoption of the Globalgap standard in the mango export sector in Peru in 2004-
2005. However, they didn’t explore the implications for smallholders. Yet the new context 
raises the question of the manner in which Peruvian small-scale farmers respond to this new 
predominant standard. Drawing on an adaptation of Hirschman’s (1970) conceptual 
framework – also used by Henson and Jaffee (2008) on the food safety standard’s impact – 
we consider three main options for mango growers in Peru: “loyalty” (implementation of the 
standard under specific conditions), “switch” of market segment, and “exit” from the market. 
We first held some qualitative interviews with experts and supply chain actors before 
implementing a quantitative approach aimed at identifying the producers’ characteristics for 
each alternative option. Surveys were conducted with 223 small-scale mango producers from 
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October 2010 to May 2011. Data was collected in northern Peru, in the region of Piura, the 
main zone of mango production.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides a background of mango production and 
trade in Peru and the evolving international trade towards standards; section 3 develops the 
analytical framework used to formulate hypotheses; section 4 describes the survey and data; 
section 5 presents and discusses the empirical findings; and section 6 concludes the paper and 
reports some policy implications of the study. 
2. Fresh mango sector in Peru  
Production and trade 
In Peru, agriculture is still a source of economic development. It accounts for 8% of the 
GDP and provides 23% of direct and indirect employment (Inei, 2008). Contrary to numerous 
exported agricultural products, mango production in Peru is also locally consumed. The 
cultivated area is around 28,400 ha for a production of 250,000 tons in 2010 (Minag, 2010). 
Peru exports around 30% of its national production (105,724 tons in 2009/2010) and is the 
fifth largest mango exporter in the world. Fresh mangos are by far the most important of 
exported mangos (87% of exported mango volumes in 2009, according to customs). Exports 
go to both the EU (65%) and US (35%) markets (Gerbaud, 2010).  
Production is concentrated in northern Peru, in the region of Piura (around 70% of the 
national production and 90% of exported production). The main mango varieties grown for 
the domestic market are the local variety, Criollo, and the improved variety, Edward. For the 
export market, improved varieties such as Kent (94.5% of export volumes) are cultivated 
(Senasa, 2010). Piura export-oriented production is harvested between November and March. 
Beyond the harvesting period, the export window is linked to the targeted market and to the 
competition between countries. For the EU market, Peru – the second largest supplier – 
competes with Brazil in November and December. For the US market, Peru – the third largest 
supplier – competes with Ecuador in December and January (Gerbaud, 2010).  
The Free On Board price (FOB, price at the exporting port) for exported Kent mangos is 
substantially higher than the price for mangos sold on the national market (except for Edward 
at the end of it harvesting season). The monthly FOB prices for exportation to the US and to 
the EU are nearly similar for both markets. Nevertheless, there are some monthly or annual 
variations due to the level of supply on the targeted market (Gerbaud, 2010). Otherwise, 
prices for Edward or Criollo varieties are substantially higher than those for the Kent variety 
on the domestic market, as Peruvian consumers do not value the taste of the latter. The 
domestic market alternative for Kent mangos is thus not profitable.  
Access to the market 
For the domestic market, mango producers generally sell their mango production though 
brokers who supply the market of Lima. Most producers have informal contracts with their 
broker where price is flexible and depends on the final demand price. These middlemen 
deduct a commission (around 10%) of the sale price, but are never product owners (Avsf, 
2008). These types of transactions require long-term relationships and confidence between the 
producer and the broker (the latter is often related to the producer) (Avsf, 2008). 
 
For the export market, the first constraint to accessing an outside market is related to the 
minimum volume required by the buyer (at least one container, i.e. 20 tons). This explains 
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why small-scale producers (on average hardly producing 20 exportable tons) have to form an 
association in order to get export market access. The second constraint is that the mango 
exporters must meet commercial quality requirements. Quality characteristics like color (red), 
appearance (no scratches) and size (at least 450 g) are essential. Lastly, although there are not 
any compulsory Peruvian public norms on good practices for domestic mango production, 
export-oriented producers require a phytosanitary certificate from the SENASA (Servicio 
Nacional de Sanidad Agraria del Peru) – the public agency in charge of inspection, control, 
and eradication of the fruit fly. 
Non-tariff measures and constraints from the US and EU markets 
For both the US and EU markets, exports are required to respect the Codex Alimentarius 
and maximum pesticide residual levels (MRL). Nevertheless, some differences exist between 
the market requirements. The most demanding norm for exportation to the US relates to a 
public norm: a hydrothermal treatment is required to kill fruit flies; the mangos undergo a hot 
water treatment in a certified processing plant. For this, the APHIS-USDA (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service) allocates personnel to each 
treatment plant so as to monitor the hydrothermal process during the fresh mango season. The 
high costs of initial investment in certified plants and treatment supervision are charged by the 
exporters, which explains why there are so few treatment plants in Peru: there are nine 
certified treatment plants, but only six are working (two in the Sullana area and four in the 
Tombogrande area). Otherwise, the US private standards required by importers are most 
frequently specific to manufacturing or processing plants: the GMP (good manufacturing 
practices) and the BASC (certified good handling and shipping practices). Concerning 
production, the most widespread private standards in mango production are those for organic 
certification. Contrary to the US, Europe does not require hydrothermal treatments. Mangos 
exported to Europe are cleaned and then packed in 20 existing packing plants in Peru. Most of 
them are also located in the Sullana and Tombogrande areas. Beyond the Codex Alimentarius 
and the MLR, barriers to trade in the EU are therefore much more relative to private 
standards: at the plant level, the HACCP is essential; at the production level, Globalgap has 
been becoming almost mandatory since 2007, and organic certification has spread. 
Export-oriented organizations and stakeholders 
In Peru, about 28,400 ha are cultivated for mango production, 70% of which are located in 
the Piura region. In 2009, 1,627 producers received phytosanitary certificates from the 
SENASA and were thus allowed to export their mangos. Among these producers, 75% are 
smallholders (less than 20 ha of total land), 20% are medium farmers (from 20 to 50 ha), and 
5% are large-scale farmers (more than 50 ha). They account for 30%, 30%, and 40% of 
exported produce, respectively. Larger farmers are generally vertically integrated into 
exporter enterprises and thus export their own mango production. However, there is large 
variability in mango production from year to yeari. Thus, these exporters generally complete 
they own production by purchasing from smaller farmers. Small-scale producers may thus 
have annual contracts (written or oral contracts, but hardly enforceable). Through these 
contracts, they steadily delegate harvests to the exporter (or a third party assigned to harvest 
on behalf of the packing plant), since it becomes very difficult to gather daily workers. In 
addition, in many cases, producers hardly have any access to credit to pay workers. A 
disadvantage of that service is the high level of mangos discarded during the harvest – the 
discarded mango rate is on average 20%. Exporters are also in charge of carrying out 
transportation to the processing plant. Prices are rarely fixed and pay is often delayed. 
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Nonetheless, for a monthly adjustment strategy, exporters do not implement farming contracts 
with smallholders. 
In 2009-2010, there were 106 fresh mango-exporting companies (Senasa, 2010). While the 
production is highly atomized, there is a rather medium concentration of exports in few 
exporting companies: the top 10 represent 46% of the total export volume. However, when 
compared to the figures from 2005-2006 (Fulponi, 2007), this concentration in the mango-
exporting sector has decreased these last five years, revealing a still very attractive and 
expandable market. Furthermore, the sector shows a relatively low entry barrier for small 
exporting companies. Therefore, the sector actors complain about the high number of small 
and very volatile exporter firms (60% treat less than 500 tons per year) that enter the market 
for short run market opportunities. These sporadic exporters are called “golondrinos” 
(meaning “swallows”). These firms are subjected to the most border rejections. On the other 
hand, larger exporters mostly rely on their own production (from 50 to 250 ha) and still tend 
towards increased vertical integration, even though land has become very expensive 
nowadays. They are generally targeting both the EU and US markets. They have easily 
enforced quality, traceability and certified production – in particular GG. They own packing 
or treatment plants or subcontract for the packing and treatment process.  
International standard schemes for fresh mangos 
The GG guideline ensures good agricultural practices focusing first on food-safety, but 
also a number of issues concerning environment quality, worker safety and hygiene, and 
traceability on the farm. The certificate includes some initial investments (such as toilets, 
canteens for workers, water taps, safety equipment, and storage facilities for agricultural 
inputs and outputs, respectively) that require substantial financial capital to upgrade the farm. 
It also entails annual costs for external inspection by a certification body. Finally it requires 
that the producer know how to read, write, and keep records – which means a high level of 
human capital. Producers have two options to obtain certification under the standard: they can 
apply individually or apply collectively for a producer group certificate. Forming producer 
groups may reduce costs at various levels (lower cost for external inspection, shared 
investments…) (Narrod, Roy et al., 2009; Asfaw, Mithöfer et al., 2010; Belton, Haque et al., 
2011). However, the mango-producing sector is little organized. Furthermore, the cost of 
compliance may appear particularly high since GG certification does not include the price 
premium. The size of an individual enterprise may thus appear as the major determinant of the 
standard’s adoption. According to our first qualitative interviews, the minimum profitable size 
to individually implement GG is around 20 ha.  
Organic production represents 1% of the total mango production in Peru (3,000 tons in 
2007). According to Promperu data from 2007, 36% of organic mangos are exported to the 
US and 64% to Europe (that is almost the same as the conventional mango market). Organic 
certification focuses on food-safety, environment quality, and traceability on the farm through 
agricultural practices that do not involve chemical inputs. The certificate includes few initial 
investments, but entails annual costs for external inspection by a certification body – meaning 
a minimum level of financial capital– and requires that the produce be able to read, write, and 
keep records – meaning again a minimum level of human capital. Again, producers have two 
options to obtain certification under the standard: they can apply individually or apply 
collectively for a producer group certificate. The organic certification generally includes a 
better price that could compensate the cost of certification and a possible lower yield. 
3. Analytical framework and hypotheses 
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An analytical framework 
Given the scarcity of an adequate amount of literature to analyze the implications that 
international sustainability standards have on the behavior of farmers, we propose to draw on 
the simple conceptual framework developed by Hirschman (1970), who analyzed the 
economic and political behavior of firms, organizations, and states facing a declining 
situation. Henson and Jaffee (2008) then used this framework in the specific case of food 
safety standards to analyze the strategic responses of developing countries. 
 
Hirschman compares strategic options by various organizations and describes strategy 
types through the concepts of “exit”, “loyalty”, and “voice” (Hirschman, 1970). The “voice” 
option involves complaining or negotiating through lobbying. Concerning food standards, 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) argue that “voice” could be understand as protesting again new 
standards, for example, at the WTO level when standards are judged unfair or as a 
protectionist barrier. The “loyalty” option involves the organization’s participation – this 
could be interpreted in the food sector as an alignment with the standard’s requirements 
(Henson e Jaffee, 2008). Lastly, the “exit” option involves ceasing participation – this could 
be interpreted in the food sector as choosing not to comply with the standard in a particular 
market, i.e. switching customers or particular markets if alternative profitable markets exist 
or, if no alternative is available, definitively stopping the activity. Moreover, Henson and 
Jaffee (2008) propose another dimension to Hirschman’s framework related to when option is 
implemented:  ex-ante “proactive” behaviors (anticipating standards) or ex-post “reactive” 
behaviors (waiting and adapting). The most negative approach is thus a combination of “exit” 
and “reactive” behaviors. 
 
As Chemnitz et al, (2007) and Henson and Jaffee (2008) have already highlighted, the 
ability to implement the various options will depend on several factors at the country, market, 
and firm levels, as well as the specific food standards. 
Specificity of the case study 
In our paper, we question the implications of the restructuring of the mango supply chain 
by growing private standard requirements, GG in particular, on small-scale producers. The 
farmers we surveyed are export-oriented (they grow the Kent variety, which is not valued 
locally), but may not be certified since they do not have enough land (they own less than 20 
ha).  
We have to specify the above framework according to the relevant options for our case 
study. The need for contextual analysis is obvious. For instance, because we focus our 
analysis on small-scale farmers in Peru who are very fragmented and little organized, the 
“voice” option does not appear relevant and most of these smallholders have “reactive” 
behaviors. We thus specify three main alternative options available to small-scale export-
oriented farmers:  
(i) Loyalty:  As we mentioned above, producers have two options to obtain certification 
under the standard: either by applying individually or by applying collectively for a producer 
group certificate. In the case of small farmers who hold less than 20 ha, the loyalty strategy at 
the individual level seems difficult due to the fixed costs of compliance. The only option is 
thus that farmers organize themselves within producer organizations so as to comply 
collectively with standards. Yet the length of the mango harvest (three months) seriously 
limits the opportunities for the development of efficient collective action.  
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(ii) Switchii: Producers will continue to export to the EU and the US indifferently since 
they adopt organic certification. Organic certification substitutes for the GG requirement in 
the EU market.  
(iii) Exit: They will no longer export to the EU and will target the US or domestic markets 
instead. This means that the “auspicious” export window is reduced for these producers, 
perhaps implying that the farmers replace their usual exporter. In extreme cases, the farmers 
may uproot their Kent mango trees (intended for export) and replant new orchards with 
Edward or Criollo mango trees for the domestic market (targeting the higher segment of the 
domestic market). 
We must mention that non-certified producers do not yet face total exclusion from the EU 
market as a whole since EU importers can buy non-certified products when no GG produce is 
available. Consequently, some small-scale producers still have not chosen an option (later, 
they will be included in a control group named “continue”). Moreover, these alternatives are 
not totally exclusive, but we assume that the third is probably more frequent.  
Besides, the above analysis framework does not give any idea of the benefits or 
disadvantages for small farmers to adopt one type of marketing behavior. We will thus 
additionally formulate a research hypothesis on the impacts of these options on income and 
marketing risk for farmers.  
Research hypotheses  
It may be necessary to introduce some hypotheses to test the impacts of marketing options 
on prices and marketing risks. We think that GG’s introduction may have ambiguous impacts 
on non-certified smallholders. 
First, when some small-scale producers choose the “loyalty” option (i.e. compliance with 
the GG standard), one could expect positive results on income and marketing stability: 
(iv) Price and Stability: GG certification does not involve the price premium, but since it 
could increase market access when the EU export market is favorable, we expect prices to 
increase. Besides, since GG compliance often leads to stronger vertical coordination through 
farming contracts, we expect producer-exporter relationship stability to increase. 
Second, the “switch” option may have positive results on the income and marketing 
stability for small-scale producers: 
(v) Price and Stability: Organic certification involves the price premium, which could 
balance the costs of compliance. It could also increase the security of market access due to 
product diversification. Consequently, we expect price and market stability to increase. 
Third, the “exit” option may have negative results on the income and marketing stability of 
non-certified smallholders:  
(vi) Price: Non-certified producers switch to supplying the domestic market, where the 
price for Kent mangos is substantially lower than on the international market.  
(vii) Risk: Non-certified producers switch to supplying “golondrinos” (unknown buyers). 
This is likely to increase their marketing risk (unstable relationships, insecure markets, low 
prices, etc.). 
However, the demand for certified products may have indirect positive results on the 
income of non-certified producers:  
(viii) Price: Conventional product demand from the US may mostly be satisfied by the 
supply chain responses of non-certified producers. In addition, the bargaining power of these 
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producers compared to small-scale exporters, such as golondrinos, may increase.  
Consequently, we could expect non-certified producer prices to increase.  
(ix) Hired labor: The increase in certified exporters’ own production increases the need for 
hired labor. Consequently, we could expect a higher labor demand for non-certified producers 
at the village level. 
(x) Income: The increase of price for conventional mangos and the increase of hired labor 
may increase the total income of non-certified producers. 
 
4. Survey and data 
 
Survey and method 
This empirical study was led in the framework of the EU NTM-Impact Project (www.ntm-
impact.eu), whose objectives include the analysis of the impacts of non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) from high-income countries – governmental regulations and private standards – on 
developing countries. Between October 2010 and May 2011, we undertook a survey of 223 
mango producers in the main mango region of Piura, where over 90% of exported mangos 
originate. We focus our analysis here on small farmers with less than 20 ha and who represent 
20-30% of mango exports and 70-80% of all mango producers. We randomly selected 19 
villages located in the two main areas where exporters’ plants are found – Sullana and 
Tambogrande. Within these villages, producer surveys were chosen randomly among the 
farmers growing Kent mangos (i.e. export-oriented) with holdings of less than 20 ha (i.e. 
small farmers for whom individual GG certification might be unprofitable). Surveys were 
conducted on a face-to-face basis. The data collected through the questionnaire include: farm 
and household general characteristics, household assets, mango production and marketing 
behavior, mango standard certifications (organic and GG), other activities, changes and 
perceptions since GG is required by exporters. According to the surveys, producers no longer 
know where their mangos are exported to because large exporters generally export to both 
markets. The producer does not choose an export target, but rather an exporter.  
 
Data analysis 
To describe the sample of producers, descriptive statistics are applied. To describe factors 
that may have influenced the farmers’ marketing behaviors and determined perceived impacts 
of standard requirements, an analysis is performed using t-test and Chi²-testiii. In this paper, 
we do not show a causal effect of GG certification on producers, but rather we depict the 
characteristics and perceptions that characterize the different types of producers in the 
alternative options. Finally, estimating a regression model tests the hypothesis concerning the 
impact of these options on the price received for mangos. In addition, we also control for 
other factors considered to be relevant, such as the variables of farm and household 
characteristics and relationships with buyers.  The dependant variable of the regression is the 
logarithm of the highest price received by the farmer. We do not know the volume sold at this 
price, but since farmers generally harvest once or twice per season and that the discarded 
mangos could not have received the highest price, we can assume that it was a sizeable 
amount of the farmer’s production. We think that it could be a good proxy of the producer’s 
bargaining power and final income (given the volume of mangos). 
 
Characteristics of farmers and marketing behaviors 
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Within our sample of 223 producers, the average farm size is 8 ha, 3.3 ha of which is 
dedicated to mango production (85% of land dedicated to mango production is for Kent 
mangos, followed by traditional mango varieties for the domestic market and personal 
consumption). 80% of respondents say that mangos are the most important product grown in 
terms of cash flow. Most small-scale producers are also day laborers at other farms (13%) or 
have extra agricultural income (14%). On average, they have grown mangos since 1997, but 
most of them started after 2000, when exportation raised dramatically. Their distance from the 
nearest plant (treatment or packing plant) is around 14 km. 
 
(i) Loyalty: 31% of farmers surveyed have heard about GG certification and only 8% (18 
cases) are GG certified. GG certified producers are scarce, as we expected for smallholder 
farmers. The average certification date is 2009 (from 2007 to 2010). The compliance cost is 
US$ 2,000 per year (without any variability among respondents). The certificate is paid 
sometimes by the producer himself, but mostly by the exporter if the farmer is under contract 
or by a producer organization (half of GG producers are members of an organization, 22% of 
the total sample). Initial investments (such as toilets, canteens for workers, water taps) are 
more often paid for by the producers thanks to a rural credit bank.  
(ii) Switch: 12.5% of producers are certified organic (28 observations). The average 
certification date is 2007 (from 2004 to 2010). The annual cost of certification is around US$ 
2,000/year and is mostly paid for by the producer himself or a producer organization (in few 
cases by the exporters).  
 
Nine producers are both GG and organic certified.  
 
(iii) Exit: 9% of producers declare to have increased their volumes sold to the domestic 
market since 2007 (33% have decreased and 54% have experienced no change). All producers 
grow varieties for the domestic market (an average of 15% of their total mango crop surface), 
but they have not increased these areas nor decreased the Kent variety areas. Otherwise, 33% 
say that they have increased their volumes sold to unknown traders since 2007 (29% have 
decreased and 35% have experienced no change). Unknown traders are generally 
golondrinos
iv, i.e. exporters with a very volatile existence, taking advantage of a particular 
market opportunity. We already know that most producers (85%) work with unknown traders 
each year, particularly to sell any Kent mangos rejected by their usual exporters. 34% of 
producers declare selling low volumes to these traders and 42% of producers declare selling a 
high volume to these traders each year. 56% of producers who declare huge volumes to 
unknown traders say that these volumes have increased since 2007 – the latter (24% of the 
total sample) are considered among the “exit” option below because they no longer know to 
whom they are selling their mangos. 
 
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
At the producer level, we compare the three options proposed above: loyalty (GG 
adopters), switch (organic adopters) and exit (selling mangos to unknown traders) behavior 
categories according to some selected variables.  
As presented in Table 1, the average total land size of GG adopters (loyalty) is 
significantly lower than the control group (continue). Yet similar to organic adopters (switch), 
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the farmers are significantly more specialized in mango production (ratio of land). Regarding 
yield in 2009, there are no significant differences among the groups – the lower yield 
expected for organic farming is not significant. Regarding the exit option, the average size of 
total land is a little lower than their counterparts and these producers have a little less mango 
production. 
Household characteristics do not show any important results in terms of our comparison, 
except that GG adopters and exit producers are more likely to have income from an 
agricultural off-farm activity. This could be explained in different ways: while it is proof of 
GG adopters’ access to financial capital that could be reinvested in their farms, conversely in 
this case of exit producers this could suggest that their farm is not profitable enough to bring 
sufficient income. They are also less likely to own a car. 
Table 1: Mean comparison analysis of producer characteristics according to 
alternative options 
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Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
a Continue is the control group (i.e. the total sample without standard adopters and producers who declare 
huge volume to unknown traders and said that this volume has increased since 2007). 
Among variables related to market access, the distance is significantly lower for standard 
adopters. This could suggest that standard compliance may be more the result of an exporter’s 
decision rather than that of the farmer. This could be supported by the fact that it is the 
exporters who manage the harvest inside the mango farms. Other variables related to 
relationships with buyers, such as contracts (used to having written contracts or not) and 
 Continue
a
 
(n=137) 
Loyalty 
(Globlgap
) 
(n= 18) 
Switch 
(Organic) 
(n=28) 
Exit  
(Do not know 
anymore their buyer) 
(n=49) 
Farm characteristics     
Total land size 8,81 4,2*** 6,8 7,18* 
Ratio of land size under 
mangos  
0,52 0,82*** 0,65** 0,53 
Ratio of mango area under 
Kent 
0,84 0,88 0,87 0,84 
Volume of mangos 2009 16,96 10,4* 10,71* 12,48* 
Yield 2009 8,00 8,34 6,69 7,47 
Household characteristics 
Age  55,6 51,4* 51,3** 57,7 
Education 1,49 1,61 1,46 1,48 
Experience 15,77 14,4 12,96** 15,57 
Children  (<15 years)  1,67 1,5 1,70 1,43 
Mobile phone 0,64 0,77 0,64 0,65 
Car 0,27 0,16 0,18 0,12** 
Date of car 1995 2004* 2002* 1991 
Agri. off farm Income  0,08 0,33*** 0,14 0,20** 
Market access and relation w/ buyer 
Distance to plant 14,9 7,8*** 11,5** 14,4 
Packing plant 0,68 0,94** 0,68 0,84** 
Works only w/ 1 exporter 0,71 0,88* 0,73 0,37 
Used to have written 
contract 
0,15 0,66*** 0,43*** 0,02** 
Used to have no contract 0,57 0,27*** 0,39** 0,77*** 
Technical advices 0,5 0,77*** 0,5 0,02*** 
Advance payment 0,18 0,44*** 0,28* 0,04** 
Month is important for 
buyer 
0,27 0,22 0,14 0,39** 
Color is important for buyer 0,49 1*** 0,90*** 0,44* 
Weight is important for 
buyer 
0,51 1*** 0,85*** 0,51 
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advance payments, differ significantly. Written contracts and advance payments attest to close 
relationships with the buyers. In the case of GG adopters, farmers are also more likely to 
receive technical advice from the buyer and the presence of nearby packing plant (namely 
exclusively EU-oriented) is significantly higher compared to the control group. The results 
lead to the same conclusion as Kleinwechter and Grethe, who have shown that vertical 
integration or some forms of closed vertical coordination, such as contract farming, can be 
seen as the most important factor influencing GG compliance (Kleinwechter e Grethe, 2006 ). 
Moreover, standard adopters’ buyers are significantly more demanding in terms of 
commercial quality (color and weight) than those of their counterparts. Finally, exit producers 
have significantly less contracts with buyers; they do not benefit from technical advice or 
advance payments, even if a packing plant is generally and significantly more accessible for 
them than for the control group. For the exit option, buyers are more demanding on the month 
of the available production, suggesting that the buyers have shortened export windows.  
From Table 2, which analyzes the farmers’ perceptions of changes since 2007, the 
perception of farmers regarding production costs do not show any significant differences 
between option categories: 60% to 75% of producers declare that production costs have 
increased. However, within the exit option group, a significant number of producers (12%) 
declare that production costs have decreased. The higher production costs expected for GG 
and organic farming are thus not significant. On the contrary, the perception of price risk and 
the stability of buyer relationships show stark differences: while a significant number of 
organic producers declare that price risk has decreased or at least not increased, GG producers 
insist on the heightened stability of their buyer relationships. For the exit option group, both 
indicators of price risk and stability have deteriorated since 2007. 
According to the categories, 11% to 21% of producers have increased the amount of land 
dedicated to mangos, particularly the Kent varietyv. Nonetheless, there is no significant 
difference between the categories. In addition, none of the producers have decreased their 
land allotments for mangos (i.e. uprooted mango trees). These results suggest that, for the 
moment, none of the producers tend to exit from the mango production activity. Since mango 
trees represent an investment, we could easily understand why producers do not react 
promptly to the market signals. Switching costs are high. In addition, both standard adopters 
are more likely to increase their land allotments for cocoa than the control group, and 
inversely the land for cereals. Cereals are annual crops for the national market. Prices vary, 
but farmers can switch crops yearly. Fruit trees (mainly lemon trees) mentioned by the 
producers surveyed are planted to sell the production on the domestic market. They represent 
an investment for farmers (trees do not produce the first years), but prices on the local market 
are more secure than on the international one. Cocoa trees represent an investment for farmers 
and the production is sold exclusively on the international market, generally allowing for 
better prices, but also higher marketing risks. Therefore, the result suggests that standard 
adopters are less risk-averse than the non-adoptersvi. With regards to the exit option, farmers 
have been more likely to grow cereals since 2007, which illustrates a defensive strategy.  
Table 2: Mean comparison analysis of producer perceptions according to alternative 
options 
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Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
Among the variables related to income and bargaining power, standard adopters are more 
likely to declare that off-farm labor has increased. When looking at the qualitative answers for 
the kind of job they have adopted, they declare to have small shops. Increasing off-farm labor 
 Continue
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(n=137) 
Loyalty 
(Globlgap
) 
(n= 18) 
Switch 
(Organic) 
(n=28) 
Exit 
(Don’t know anymore 
their buyer) 
(n=49) 
Risks and stability in market access 
Production costs have 
increased 
0,60 0,72 0,75 0,67 
Production costs have 
decreased 
0 0 0 0,12*** 
Price risk has increased 0,66 0,66 0,50** 0,82** 
Price risk has decreased 0,15 0,11 0,28* 0,14 
Stability of relation w/ buyer 
has increased 
0,32 0,50** 0,43* 0,14** 
Stability of relation w/ buyer 
has decreased 
0,25 0,05** 0,25 0,37 
Increased land under Kent 0,21 0,11 0,14 0,20 
Increased land under cereals 0,22 0*** 0*** 0,35* 
Increased land under fruit 
trees 
0,36 0,61* 0,39 0,47 
Increased land under cocoa 0,02 0,44*** 0,21*** 0 
Income and bargaining power 
Off farm labor has increased 0,07 0,16* 0,21*** 0** 
Off farm labor has decreased 0,18 0,05 0,18 0,12 
Mango prices have increased  0,37 0,55 0,57* 0,40 
Mango prices have 
decreased 
0,32 0,22 0,21 0,34 
Earlier payment 0,24 0,38 0,14 0,24 
Later payment 0,33 0,05** 0,28 0,24 
Bargaining power has 
increased 
0,26 0,33 0,32 0,08*** 
Bargaining power has 
decreased 
0,31 0*** 0,17** 0,53*** 
Income has increased 0,34 0,55** 0,43 0,22 
Income has decreased 0,30 0,16 0,32 0,48** 
Working conditions 
Labor has increased 0,49 0,77** 0,86*** 0,63* 
Labor has decreased 0,021 0 0,01 0 
Working conditions are 
improved 
0,26 0,72*** 0,50*** 0,14* 
Working conditions are 
deteriorated  
0,19 0*** 0*** 0,42*** 
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may thus reflect a better financial situation for these farmers, as they were able to invest in the 
shop, rather than a pessimistic one (looking for extra income outside of an unprofitable farm). 
For the exit option group, off-farm labor has not increased. Our hypothesis that certified 
exporters are more likely to increase their need for hired labor and thus the demand for labor 
at the village level does not concern hired labor from the exit option group. Since labor 
contracts are for only three months, the mango season’s peak, we can think that the seasonal 
workers are thus generally not mango producers themselves. Organic farmers are more likely 
to declare that mango prices have increased (57% of them) since GG farmers a large number 
of them declare that their income has increased and that they do not receive later payment for 
that. In addition, both standard adopter categories perceive that their bargaining power has not 
decreased since 2007, while their counterparts dramatically perceive a decrease of their 
bargaining power. Lastly, among the variables related to working conditions, both standard 
adopter categories declare that the labor has increased in their farm since they have complied 
with the standard. However, their working conditions have also significantly improved. 
Actually, mango production is low labor-intensive. Yet because they comply with the 
standards, farmers have increased their labor time on the farm, mostly because they have to 
keep records of all their farm practices. On the contrary, exit option producers declare that 
their amount of work has increased on the farm, but their working conditions have 
deteriorated.  
 
To further investigate how the bargaining power of farmers is affected by the certification, 
we estimate a simple regression on the level of the highest price received by farmers in 2009 
for Kent mangos (Table 3). According to the results of our model, the loyalty option (GG 
adopters) is positively and strongly related to receiving a better price for mangos, 
corroborating our hypothesis. We cannot conclude that the causality of certification on the 
price levelvii, but the result can suggest that if there is no price premium included in GG 
compliance, certified farmers have better access to the market when the price is high and the 
supply is highly competitive. In the same way, the coefficient for the switch option (organic 
certification) shows that produced received a significantly a better price, corroborating the 
fact that organic certification generally includes a price premium from the buyer. According 
to our initial hypothesis, the exit option (non-certified producers who no longer know their 
buyers) may have ambiguous effects on the price: from the Table 3 results, none of the 
hypotheses (positive or negative impacts on the price) are actually verified. Among the other 
statistically significant variables in our model, the total volume of mangos sold in 2009 is 
positively correlated to a higher price, as we could expect since the volume also determined 
the bargaining power of farmers with traders. The month of the mango harvest is also 
important in determining the price received. Consequently, producers for whom harvests 
mostly take place in January are more likely to receive a lower price. Otherwise, we find no 
evidence that having more experience, getting a car or a mobile phone – this could increase 
farmer bargaining power through better access to information —improves the prices received 
by farmers. Moreover, the fact that a treatment plant (i.e. easier exporter access to both the US 
and EU markets) is the most available plant for the farmer does not influence the price 
received for mangos. And finally, to be paid earlier does not damage the bargaining power of 
farmers.   
Table 3: Regression estimation results 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the gap in the literature regarding the implications that international 
sustainability standards have on the behavior of (potentially) excluded farmers and their 
impacts in terms of marketing risks and income levels. Drawing on the adapted concepts of 
Hirschman (1970), we have used this analytical framework to compare alternative options that 
mango producers in Peru have been progressively following since GG exporter requirements 
are growing. Data collected through a representative and large number of surveys with small-
scale export-oriented producers (223 surveys) show three main options adopted by these 
farmers. First, we find evidence that the loyalty option exists since some small-scale 
producers are complying with GG (8% of our sample). Exporting companies thus support 
these farmers in complying with the standard through farming contracts, technical advice, and 
by paying the annual certification costs. This support allows small-scale producers to be 
included in the lucrative international market (these farmers received a significantly better 
price for mangos). Nonetheless, farmers who are integrating into this supply chain seem to be 
selected according to two characteristics: they are more specialized in mango production 
(more than 80% of their land) and they are closer to the exporter plant. Exporters may thus 
decrease transaction costs by selecting productive farmers close to their plant. Second, we 
found farmers who adopt another option (switch option) to bypass the difficulties of 
complying with GG certification by implementing organic certification. Organic certification, 
which required less initial investment from farmers, substitutes for the GG requirement in the 
EU market. Third, we found a steady number of farmers who declare that they no longer 
know their mango buyers. These buyers are the well-known golondrinos, which represent 
30% to 50% of the exporter companies and are very volatile. Farmers belonging to this option 
Dependant variable: log. of highest price for mango in 
2009 
Coeff. Std. dev. 
Alternative options 
Loyalty 0.205*** 0.080 
Switch 0.123** 0.064 
Exit - 0.156 0.049 
Farm characteristics 
Volume of mangos 2009 0.002** 0.001 
Production peak in December - 0.005 0.042 
Production peak in January - 0.119*** 0.049 
Household characteristics 
Experience -0.002 0.002 
Mobile phone 0.045 0.044 
Car 0.067 0.050 
Market access and relation w/ buyer 
Packing plant 0.042 0.049 
Risks and stability in market access 
Earlier payment -0.057 0.047 
Constant 2.382*** 0.141 
Pseudo-R² 0.17  
 207  
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group seem to be very affected by this change: a large majority (82%) declares that price risk 
has increased, that stability with farmers has rather not increased (compared to their 
counterparts), their bargaining power and their agricultural income have decreased, and last 
that their working conditions have deteriorated. They are particularly vulnerable because their 
level of investment (mango trees) impedes to radically change of farm activity. Switching 
costs are high. These farmers – characterized by rather low total land size, low mango 
volume, and never used to getting any contract farming, technical advice, or advance 
payments – represent 24% of our total sample.  
This study aimed to contribute to the analysis of the extent to which small-scale farmers 
are affected by non-certification and thus how problematic such forms of exclusion are. The 
latter is of interest to policymakers since Peruvian agriculture is still source of economic 
development and represents a large source of employment. We show in this case study a 
significant level of exit option (which is more an exit of the stable usual supply chain than a 
definite market exit). Consequences of growing international standards in different 
agricultural sectors are thus very important to analyze in order to develop adapted policy 
recommendations.  
Finally, to pursue this analysis it would be interesting to better understand why some 
farmers (the “continue” control group) are still not affected by the international standard 
requirements, without any changes to their way of supplying exporters. It would thus be 
necessary to interview their specific exporters. Otherwise, this could be due to the lack of GG 
enforcement, since it is known that some exporters mix certified production with uncertified 
production and sell it under the same brand (Fulponi, 2007). Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
get GG figures to compare the surface certified and the volume sold with the global standard.  
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i For example, the 2008-2009 season was disastrous in terms of production (due to agronomic reasons). 
Numerous producers mention a reduction of around 50% of their production level. 
ii Contrary to Hirschman’s framework, in our particular case, we do not include switching customers in the exit 
option because “switching” here means to comply with another standard, which is related to an offensive 
strategy by farmers following the widespread use of GG certification. 
iii We cannot use a multivariate logistic regression model because alternative options are not totally exclusive. 
iv This is less likely to be a new broker for the domestic market, which does not present a profitable opportunity 
for the Kent variety. In addition, in the domestic market, producers are used to working with the same broker, 
often a relative. 
v While producers have increased land allotments for mangos since 2007, it is always with the Kent variety and 
never with other domestic market varieties (Criollo or Edward). 
vi Since cereals may require more land than fruit trees or cocoa to be profitable, we control that the land size area 
available for other crops in the farm was not a limiting factor for standard adopters to increase land allotments 
for cereals. 
vii We have no latent variables to control whether the price is due to the new certification or to the fact that this 
group of producers may have been initially more efficient. 
